The Accordions of War, Part VI
Many people have questioned Chirac's motivation for vehemently supporting Saddam Hussein. Italian writer Oriana Fallaci believes Chirac does not care about the Iraqis, but for oil.
...the mellifluous Jacques Chirac does not give a damn for peace but plans to satisfy his vanity with the Nobel Peace Prize. Where there is no wish to remove Saddam Hussein because Saddam Hussein means the oil that the French companies pump from Iraqi wells. And where (forgetting a little flaw named Petain) France chases its Napoleonic desire to dominate the European Union, to establish its hegemony over it.
Likewise, the analysts at Jane's believe Chirac understands what he is risking, but considers playing for European influence is worth the risk.
France used to have large oil interests in Iraq, and a reasonable expectation of retaining some influence in the region. Chirac's current policy has put all this at risk. The French attitude has also split Europe, with Britain, Spain, Italy and the former communist countries in eastern Europe now deeply suspicious of Paris. The French leader always knew that, ultimately, he could not stop the USA from resorting to war. So why is he persisting?Mainly because he believes that all the disadvantages pale into insignificance in comparison with the ultimate prize: a France that leads all those willing to stand up to US 'arrogance' around the world, a France that articulates Europe's distinct opinion and enjoys a good reputation in the Arab world as well.
It is clear that Chirac’s position is simply driven by politics, not principles (unless you count the desire to reduce American influence as a principle). From a political perspective, the question then becomes "Is Chirac's gamble a wise move?" I believe the answer is no. The Economist shares my perspective:
Mr Chirac has won glowing reviews as the man who is doing a fair job of taking the superpower down a peg or two. France would not be France if its president did not occasionally try to puncture the grandiosity of an America accused as ever of taking the acquiescence of smaller nations for granted. But what if, now that he has picked this particular fight, Mr Chirac proceeds to lose it?This could now happen in very short order. America and Britain have given themselves only a couple of weeks to pass their new resolution. Should they fail--either because they cannot muster a majority or because another of the permanent five casts a veto--Mr Bush will almost certainly feel compelled to fulfil his promise to go to war anyway. If the war goes badly, bringing disaster all round, Mr Chirac will be able to claim a barren sort of vindication. But if it goes even half-way towards achieving Mr Bush's vision of a democratic future for the Middle East, France will have absented itself from a history-changing intervention in a part of the world where it has long claimed a special influence. It will also have demonstrated the impotence of the Security Council, the very institution from which the French (and British) derive so much standing by virtue of being veto-wielding members.
I wonder what French historians will think of Chirac if his actions result in a further reduction of international French influence and the loss of sizeable revenue contracts to French firms? It will probably part of the concluding paragraph on his rule, next to mentioning his telling the Eastern European nations to shut up. I am glad I am not in his shoes - that is a legacy to avoid.
